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Regulating Squeeze-out Techniques by Controlling Shareholders: the Divergence 
Between Hong Kong and Singapore 
 
 Abstract  
Squeeze-out transactions are controversial as the controlling shareholders may 
expropriate the minorities’ shareholdings at unattractive prices. Existing scholarship has 
focused on the optimal approach towards regulating such transactions in the US and the 
UK, which have widely dispersed public shareholdings, but little attention is placed on 
jurisdictions with concentrated shareholdings, which may necessitate a different 
approach given that the prospects of expropriation are very high. This article fills the gap 
by examining Hong Kong and Singapore, which have concentrated shareholdings. 
Notwithstanding the fact that they have adapted their corporate and securities laws from 
the UK, Hong Kong ultimately provides greater minority shareholder protection than 
Singapore.  
We present empirical evidence that the differences in regulation have led to a smaller 
number of squeeze-outs but higher premium payable to minority shareholders in Hong 
Kong, as compared to Singapore. However, Hong Kong firms experience higher levels of 
related party transactions prior to the squeeze-outs, which represent another form of 
tunnelling. We explain that the differences in regulation and discuss the normative 
implications of our findings. Our study contributes to the broader literature that “law 
matters” and provides case studies of how interest group politics shape the evolvement of 
laws and regulation. 
Keywords 
Squeeze-outs, delistings, going private transactions, controlling shareholders, takeovers; 
Hong Kong; Singapore 
Number of words (excluding footnotes, title page and abstract): 10,282 
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I. Introduction 
Squeeze-outs are controversial because the controlling shareholders can force the 
minority shareholders to sell their shares against their wishes and at unattractive prices. 
However, there are often good reasons to allow squeeze-outs, including enabling the listed 
company to achieve better costs savings and a more efficient organisational structure. In 
addition, controlling shareholders may wish to avoid the costs associated with running a 
listed company, especially where the company has not tapped into the capital markets for a 
significant amount of time.1  
For these reasons, many jurisdictions, including the United States (US)2 and the 
United Kingdom (UK),3 allow squeeze-outs. US (Delaware law) protects minority 
shareholders through a combination of shareholder appraisal rights4 and fiduciary duty class 
actions.5 UK does not have appraisal rights nor class action suits and instead requires 
supermajority of the minority votes or acceptances. However, while there is a substantial 
body of scholarly work discussing the optimal approach towards squeeze-outs in the UK6 and 
                                                          
[Acknowledgement of funding redacted] 
1  See V Khanna and U Varottil, “Regulating Privatizations in India: A Comparative Perspective” (2015) 
63 American Journal of Comparative Law 1009.  
2  In Delaware, US, squeeze-outs are known as freeze-out transactions. See G Subramanian, “Fixing 
Freezeouts” (2005) 116 Yale LJ 2; G Subramanian, “Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence” (2007) 
36 J Legal Studies 1. 
3  See Part III below. 
4  Eg Delaware General Corporations Law (DGCL), s 262. Section 262 provides for an appraisal remedy 
for shares of any class or series of stock, of a constituent corporation in all mergers and consolidations effected 
under the DGCL, with certain exceptions. Dissenting shareholders can apply to court to compel that the 
controllers pay them a fair value for their shares. For discussion on problems of the fair value see B Wertheimer, 
“The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value” (1998) 47 Duke LJ 613. 
5  For a discussion on Delaware fiduciary class action suits, see V Khanna and U Varottil, n 1 above.  
6  For a discussion relating to schemes of arrangement in UK, see D Kershaw, Principles of Takeover 
Regulation (OUP, 2016); J Payne, “Schemes of Arrangement, Takeovers and Minority Shareholder Protection” 
(2011)  11 JCLS 67.  
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US7 where the public shareholders are widely dispersed,8 there is limited research as to the 
empirical effects of the regulatory framework in jurisdictions with concentrated 
shareholdings which may require a different approach, given the prospects of squeeze-
out/delisting are very high.  
This article fills the gap by examining squeeze-outs in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
Both jurisdictions have concentrated shareholdings9 and are financial centres in Asia. Both 
have adapted UK corporate and securities laws, and thus have similar rules on corporate law 
and takeover regulation. 10 Both jurisdictions have a large number of overseas companies. 
Both jurisdictions also have relatively strong robust enforcement framework.11  
Part II begins by defining the problems of squeeze-outs and how our work fits into the 
broader literature. In Part III, we discuss the three common forms of squeeze-outs involving 
target companies that are incorporated either locally (Singapore or Hong Kong, as the case 
may be) or in one of the overseas jurisdictions with English origins.12 First, the bidder may 
                                                          
7  For a discussion on US approaches towards squeeze-outs, see G Subramanian, “Fixing Freezeouts”, n 
2, above; G Subramanian, “Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence”, n 2, above; R Gilson & J 
Gordon, “Controlling Controlling Shareholders” (2003) 152 U Penn LR 785. 
8  For comparative discussion on European and US approaches towards squeeze-outs, see M Ventoruzzo 
“Freeze-Outs: Transcontinental Analysis and Reform Proposals” (2010) 50 Virginia Journal of International 
Law 841. 
9  See Claessens S, Djankov S & Lang LHP “The separation of ownership and control in East Asian 
Corporations” (2000) 58 J Finan Econ 81; Carney, R. W. and Child, T. B., “Changes to the Ownership and 
Control of East Asian Corporations Between 1996 and 2008” (2013) 107 J Finan Econ 494  (for a more recent 
snapshot on the ownership concentration in selected East Asian listed issuers, including Hong Kong and 
Singapore).  
10  For a discussion of legal transplantation of UK-style takeover regulation in Hong Kong and Singapore 
respectively, see D Donald, “Evolutionary Development in Hong Kong of Transplanted UK-Origin Takeover 
Rules” and WY Wan “Legal Transplantation of UK-Style Takeover Regulation in Singapore”, both in U 
Varottil and WY Wan eds, Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming, 2017, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2693518 
and https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2862805 respectively). 
11  CLSA, CG Watch 2016: Ecosystems matter; Asia’s path to better home-grown governance (September 
2016), p. 15 (comparing the scores for enforcement framework between Singapore and Hong Kong). 
12  The English-origins jurisdictions are Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and British Virgin Islands (BVI). 
These countries constitute the top jurisdictions for overseas companies listed in Hong Kong and Singapore 
(constituting more than 80% of the overseas listed companies in each case). Data is at March 2017 and source: 
CapitalIQ. As explained below, in addition to the companies incorporated in the above-mentioned jurisdictions, 
we have also included companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and listed in Hong 
Kong; for the purposes of Hong Kong rules, they are treated as functionally equivalent to schemes of 
 5 
 
make a general offer for the target shares and when it achieves a high acceptance threshold, it 
may compulsorily acquire the remaining shares. Alternatively, the bidder may obtain full 
control of the target company in a single transaction via a scheme of arrangement. The last 
option is that the target company obtains the approval of the shareholders for its delisting and 
the bidder makes an exit offer to the minority shareholders (known as a delisting offer). We 
include delisting offers in our study as they are the functional equivalent of squeeze-outs. 
Delistings deprive the shareholders of a market for their shares, and indirectly force the 
minority shareholders to tender their shares to the controlling shareholders.13 
In Part III, we explain that while the company and securities laws in Hong Kong and 
Singapore are adapted from the UK, there are important differences. Hong Kong is much 
more restrictive of squeeze-outs than Singapore in many respects. The differences raise a 
number of interesting questions. First, do the outcomes in the premium that is payable to 
minority shareholders correlate with the methods of squeeze-out in Hong Kong and 
Singapore? In other words, we are interested to know whether a more stringent regime would 
enhance the welfare of minority shareholders (in terms of premiums paid over share prices). 
Second, how can we explain the divergences between the regulatory framework of two 
otherwise superficially similar systems? Third, what are the normative lessons and 
implications of the findings for Hong Kong and Singapore?  
To develop our analysis, in Part IV, we examine squeeze-out transactions of 
companies listed on Singapore Exchange (SGX) and Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) 
                                                          
arrangement because the Hong Kong regulators require the issuers to comply with the 75% approval threshold 
required for schemes of arrangement. There is no reported instance of a squeeze-out for a PRC-incorporated 
company listed in Singapore. See discussion in n 50 and accompanying text below. See Part III below for a 
detailed discussion on the three methods of squeeze-outs/delistings involving both locally and foreign 
incorporated companies in the two jurisdictions. 
 
13  See E Rock, P Davies, H Kanda and R Kraakman, “Fundamental Changes” in The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law (R Kraakman et al ed, 2nd edition, 2009), p 207. 
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by controlling shareholders (defined for our purposes as holding 30% or more shares) for the 
period 2008-2014. The companies include local and foreign companies.14 30% threshold is 
chosen as the indicator of control as it is the threshold for the purposes of the mandatory bid 
rule in both jurisdictions.15 Our analysis shows that there are significant differences in the 
frequencies and outcomes of squeeze-outs in two jurisdictions, with minority shareholders 
receiving lower number of squeeze-outs but larger premiums in Hong Kong, as compared in 
Singapore. However, in Hong Kong (but not in Singapore), we find that controlling 
shareholders engage in significantly higher levels of self-dealing transactions in the fiscal 
year prior to the squeeze-outs where the squeeze-outs are effected by controlling shareholders 
as compared to squeeze-outs by non-controlling shareholders. Our findings suggest that 
controlling shareholders in Hong Kong may have engaged in more significant forms of 
tunnelling via self-dealing.  
 In Part V, we explain the reasons for the differences in the regulatory framework for 
squeeze-outs in the two jurisdictions. In Part VI, we discuss the normative implications and 
we conclude in Part VII. Our study contributes to the literature on squeeze-outs and the 
broader agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders in the following 
ways. First, we offer new empirical findings on the squeeze-out transactions of Hong Kong 
and Singapore, which demonstrates that the small, but significant, difference in the regulatory 
framework can lead to different outcomes for minority shareholders. Second, we seek to 
establish the link between self-dealing transactions and squeeze-outs, which may suggest that 
                                                          
14  The statistics from World Federation of Exchanges, as at December 2015, shows that 37% of the 
companies listed on SGX are foreign companies. In respect of Hong Kong, as at March 2017, only 15% of the 
companies listed on SEHK are incorporated under Hong Kong law. Source: CapitalIQ.  (See also D Donald, A 
Financial Centre for Two Empires (2013, CUP), ch 3). We have not used the statistics from World Federation 
of Exchanges for Hong Kong as it classifies China-incorporated companies as “domestic”. 
15  Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers (Singapore Takeover Code), rule 14; Hong Kong Codes on 
Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buybacks (Hong Kong Takeover Code), rule 26. When a bidder and its 
concert parties acquires 30% of the voting shares, it is required to make a mandatory bid for the remaining 
shares that it does not own.  
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controllers extract benefits from the targets with these self-dealing transactions before 
effecting the squeeze-outs.  Our study also contributes to the broader academic debate on 
whether “law matters” and presents two case studies of how the transplantation of UK model 
of securities regulation evolves differently due to public policy choices, market conditions, 
market participants and other factors. 
II. Squeeze-outs and Theoretical Framework 
 
1. The agency problem and the “law matters” thesis 
 
Squeeze-out is controversial because it deprives a shareholder of continued 
participation in the company that he has invested in and which he expects to enjoy the upside, 
if any, until such time he chooses to sell or the company is wound up. In particular, where 
controlling shareholders effect the squeeze-out, scholars have regarded it as a form of 
appropriation of private benefits of control since they (controlling shareholders) are 
eliminating the minority shareholders at a price that reflects “the discount equivalent to the 
private benefits of control available from operating the controlled company”.16 This raises the 
classical agency problem as to the conflict between the interests of controlling and non-
controlling shareholders in controlled companies (also known as Type II agency problems), 
which is distinct from the agency problem as to the conflict between the interests of managers 
and shareholdings found in widely dispersed companies.17  
 
                                                          
 
16  R Gilson and J Gordon, “Controlling Controlling Shareholders”, n 7 above, at 796. 
17  E Fama and M Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control” (1983) 26 Journal of Law & Economics 
301; A Shleifer and R Vishy, “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control” (1986) 94 Journal of Political 
Economy 461. 
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The conflicts of interests arise in the following respects. First, controlling 
shareholders can choose the timing for the squeeze-out transaction and there is room for 
opportunistic behaviour. For an example, controlling shareholders may choose to privatise 
when the prices are at a historical low. 18  Controlling shareholders, who have inside 
information, may also choose to privatise to deprive the minority shareholders of the upside, 
which the insiders (controlling shareholders) may foresee, would occur due to upcoming 
changes in market conditions, more positive outlook or prospects of the company. While the 
law on insider dealing will limit opportunistic behaviour by curbing trading on inside 
information, controlling shareholders may still take advantage of their non-specific insights 
of the value of the company (such as the outlook of the company or its earnings cycle), which 
does not amount to insider dealing.   
 
Second, controlling shareholders choose the value of the consideration payable to the 
minority shareholders and this consideration does not always have to be approved by the 
target boards.19 For examples, general offers and delisting offers may be effected without the 
approval of the target board (including its independent directors) which could have 
potentially overcome the collective action problem of the minority shareholders. Further, 
controlling shareholders could influence the value of the target, such as by entering into self-
dealing transactions prior to the squeeze-out, thereby depressing the value of the target’s 
market price and then seek to privatise the company at low prices.20  
                                                          
18  E.g. see Bebchuk, L.A., Kahan, M., 2000, “Adverse selection and gains to controllers in corporate 
freezeouts” in: Morck, R. (Ed.), Concentrated Corporate Ownership (The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 
pp. 247–259. For an example of opportunistic behaviour in Hong Kong, see the going private transaction in Re 
PCCW [2009] HKCU 720, where the Court of Appeal in Hong Kong noted that the going private occurred when 
the price of PCCW shares were a historic nine-year low, and that the controllers were seeking to deprive the 
minority shareholders of the prospective increase in the value of the shares following an upturn. 
19  Cf US (Delaware) where in a merger freeze-out, the special committee appointed by the target board 
has the ability to veto the transaction. See G Subramanian, “Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence”, 
n 2 above. 
20  Du J, He Q & Yuen SW  “Tunneling and the decision to go private: Evidence from Hong Kong” (2013) 
22 Pacific Basin Finan J 50. 
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However, existing legal and corporate finance literature has recognised a blanket ban 
on squeeze-outs is not optimal on economic grounds. First, there may be legitimate reasons 
why a controlling shareholder wishes to obtain 100% of the target. A controlling shareholder 
may be only willing to grant further financing on the basis that he holds 100% of the target. A 
bidder, including a controlling shareholder, may wish to obtain maximum synergies arising 
from the takeover and effect a re-organization of the assets of the target. A bidder may wish 
to obtain 100% of the target to be able to utilise the assets of the target ultimately for 
leveraged financing.21 Second, from the issuers’ perspectives, they may wish to save costs 
from continued listing, particularly if they have not tapped the capital markets for financing. 
Allowing a very small minority of shareholders to block the squeeze-out may lead to a 
decrease in value-enhancing transactions. 
 
Getting the balance right between controlling and minority shareholders is important. 
A significant body of research, known as “law matters” research, led by La Porta et al, has 
shown that the legal framework governing financial markets and corporate governance, in 
particular, protection of minority shareholders, had an important role to play in creating the 
conditions for strong capital markets.22  While the link between law and financial 
development is one of cause or effect has been hotly debated in later studies,23 the hypothesis 
has not been decisively rejected. Legal requirements impose constraints on controlling 
                                                          
21  Wan Wai Yee & Umakanth Varottil, Mergers and Acquisitions in Singapore: Law and Practice 
(LexisNexis, 2013) at p 619. 
22  La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A & Vishny RW “Law and finance” (1998) 106 J Polit 
Economy 1113 (examining the rules protecting shareholders in common law and civil law countries and their 
hypothesis is that small shareholders have less influence in jurisdictions that do not protect their rights). See also  
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F & Shleifer A (2008) “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins” 46 J. 
Econ. Lit. 285 (rectifying some of the strong former claims in the 1998 work). 
23  See eg J Coffee, “The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation 
of Ownership and Control (2001) 111 Yale LJ 1 (arguing that legal developments have tended to follow, rather 
than precede, economic change).  
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shareholders’ ability to privatise the targets at unfair prices. It remains an empirical question 
as to whether the wealth effects to minority shareholders consequential upon squeeze-outs are 
correlated to the kind of legal protections in two different jurisdictions, which this paper 
seeks to test.   
 
 
2. Interest Group Theory and Concentrated / Dispersed Shareholdings  
 
One of the more recent debates in comparative takeover law literature is the role of 
interest group politics in explaining the evolution of takeover law. In influential article 
discussing the evolution of the hostile takeover regime in UK and US, Armour and Skeel 
argue that UK takeover regulation, favouring greater protection of shareholders’ interests 
found in the City Code of Takeovers and Mergers (UK Code), is attributable to the UK’s self-
regulatory regime and aggressive lobbying by the institutional shareholders, as opposed to the 
US where the courts remain the arbiter of takeover disputes.24 UK takeover regulation is 
shaped by institutional shareholders pre-empting legislative intervention while US regulation 
is derived from judge-made case law, largely from Delaware. More recently, Armour, Jacobs 
and Milhaupt extended the analysis to Japan, which has adopted elements of US takeover 
regulation and which has largely dispersed shareholdings of publicly listed companies. They 
argue that the diversity in the hostile takeover regimes in all three jurisdictions is the product 
of the interaction between the ‘demand side’ (being the individuals, firms or public) and the 
‘supply side’ of rule production (being the legislature, courts and regulators).25  
                                                          
24  See J Armour and D Skeel, Jr, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – The Peculiar 
Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation’, (2007) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 95, 1727-1794 
(arguing, in the context of explaining why US and UK have different substantive rules on defensive measures, 
that the mode of regulation matters).  
25  See J Armour, J B Jacobs, C J Milhaupt, ‘The Evolution of Hostile Takeover Regimes in Developed 
and Emerging Markets: An Analytical Framework’, (2011) 52 Harvard International Law Journal  221-285. 
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Can the theory of interest group politics apply outside of the US, the UK and Japan, 
which have relatively dispersed shareholding, to explain the different paths of evolution of 
Hong Kong and Singapore’s regulation of squeeze-outs? Both jurisdictions have relatively 
concentrated shareholdings and share many similarities in their corporate and securities laws; 
they have adapted their company legislation from the UK, and have adopted the UK Code 
and its Takeover Panel in respect of the regulation of public takeovers. Both also have similar 
legal constraints on corporate insiders and controlling shareholders in gaining 
disproportionate benefits of private control at the expense of minority shareholders.26 
However, as the discussion in Part III shows, Hong Kong has significantly restricted squeeze-
outs by enhancing minority shareholder protections and Singapore has gone the other 
direction in lowering the barriers for squeeze-outs. We seek to test whether the interest group 
theory explains the reasons for the differences, based on the evolvement of the law and 
regulation governing squeeze-outs in both jurisdictions. 
III.  Squeeze-outs in Hong Kong and Singapore: Regulatory Differences  
 
As outlined in Part I, there are three principal methods of squeeze-outs by controlling 
shareholders in Hong Kong and Singapore: first, the controlling shareholders makes a general 
offer followed by compulsory acquisition; 27 second, the controlling shareholders acquire 
100% control of the target company via a scheme of arrangement;28  and third, the controlling 
shareholders procure the delisting of the target and then make a delisting offer for the 
remaining shares.29 Delisting offers are matters of stock exchange regulation in both Hong 
                                                          
26  See discussion in Part IV(3) below.  
27  Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2012, section 693; Singapore Companies Act, s 215.  
28  Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2012, sections 673-674; Singapore Companies Act, s 210. 
29  SEHK listing rule 6.12; Singapore Listing Manual, rr 1307 and 1309. There are also other methods of 
squeeze-outs/delistings, such as the statutory amalgamation in Singapore (sections 215A to 215G of the 
Singapore Companies Act) or its equivalent such as the statutory merger process in Cayman Islands (Part 16 of 
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Kong and Singapore. While the first two forms of squeeze-outs are generally matters for the 
law of incorporation of the target, as we explain below, in certain instances, the securities 
laws, particularly the takeover codes, may offer additional levels of protection to minority 
shareholders which apply to all local public companies and foreign companies with primary 
listings in Hong Kong and Singapore.30  
  
1. General offers and transaction arbitrage 
 
The UK Companies Act 1929 first introduced the possibility of compulsory 
acquisitions of companies by providing that if holders of 90% or more of the shares of the 
target company accepted the takeover offer by the offeror, the offeror could compulsorily 
acquire the remaining shares on the same terms accepted by the majority.31 The rationale was 
to facilitate bidders obtaining 100% control of the targets. 32  Singapore and Hong Kong 
adapted this particular provision on compulsory acquisition via the Companies Act 1967 and 
the Companies Ordinance 193233 respectively, pursuant to the general reception of the UK 
                                                          
Companies Law (2013 Revision) or the 95% statutory merger in Bermuda (section 103 of the Bermuda 
Companies Act 1981) or the plan of merger in BVI (section 170 of the BVI Business Companies Act 2004). We 
have excluded the Singapore statutory amalgamations as they have not been used for public mergers and 
acquisition deals. In relation to the equivalents in the other jurisdictions mentioned in this footnote, in general, 
the Hong Kong securities regulator requires these processes to comply with the 90% disinterested shareholder 
acceptance (even for squeeze-outs akin to squeeze-outs such as the 95% statutory merger in Bermuda). See Part 
III below. 
30  Hong Kong Takeover Code, rule 4.1; Singapore Securities and Futures Act (Cap 289), ss 138, 139 and 
140. 
31  UK Companies Act 1929, 19 & 20 Geo 5, c 23, s 155.  
32  In UK, prior to 1929, while many of the companies were successful in acquiring 100% control of 
targets if they had wanted to do so, there was a small minority of cases where such control could not be 
obtained, either because of holdout or because of shareholder unavailability. As a result, the UK Companies Act 
1929 was enacted which provided that if holders of 90% or more of the shares of the company being acquired 
accepted the takeover offer, the bidder could compulsorily acquire the remaining shares on the same terms 
accepted by the majority.  See also B Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business 
Transformed (OUP, 2008), at p 43. See also the Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cohen 
Report 1945), para 141. 
33  Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 1932, s 154.  
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company legislation. However, the development of the compulsory acquisitions post-
reception in the two jurisdictions followed different paths.  
These differences arose as a result of the two jurisdictions departing on whether to 
align their laws with subsequent UK developments; in 1985, UK Companies Act 198534 
required that shareholdings of the offeror company or its nominee and its “associates” to be 
disregarded for computing the 90% acceptance threshold.35 This provided an important 
minority shareholder protection in requiring that only independent shareholders’ 
shareholdings count towards the compulsory acquisition threshold.  
 
In Hong Kong, in 2002, following the UK developments, the Takeover Code 
introduced rule 2.11 to exclude shares held by “concert parties” of the bidder in counting 
whether the 90% threshold is achieved.36 It is important to note that the protection in the 
Hong Kong Takeover Code, which excludes acceptances by concert parties of the bidder, 
applies to all public companies, and foreign companies with primary listings in Hong Kong.  
Almost a decade later, the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2012 provided legislative 
backing to the provision, though it applied only to Hong Kong-incorporated companies.37  
 
                                                          
34  The amendment was inserted by Financial Services Act 1986, s 172 (1) and Schedule 12. 
35  Section 430E, UK Companies Act 1985 provides that an associate of an offeror company means: (i) 
nominee of the offeror company; (ii) holding company, subsidiary or fellow subsidiary of the offeror company, 
or a nominee of such holding company, subsidiary or fellow subsidiary; (iii) a body corporate in which the 
offeror company is substantially interested; and (iv) any person, who is, or is a nominee of, a party to any 
agreement with the offeror for the acquisition of, or an interest in, the shares that are the subject of the take-over 
offer. This provision is now found in s 988 of the UK Companies Act 2006. 
36  Securities and Futures Commission, Consultation of the Review of the Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
(February 1998).  
37  HK Companies Ordinance, s 693 read with s 667. The definition of “associates” in s 988 the UK 
Companies Act 2006 is similar to the definition in s 667 of the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2012. While 
the reference in the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2012 is to “associates”, it is all intents and purposes 
similar to “concert parties” used in the HK Takeover Code.  
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Singapore has not followed the changes in the UK. Insofar as Singapore law is 
concerned, the matter is entirely governed by the law of incorporation of the target 
company.38  In 2002, while the Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee 
recommended that Singapore follow the UK position in excluding associates from counting 
towards the 90% acceptance threshold, 39 the Singapore Companies Act was amended to only 
exclude shareholdings held by a “related corporation” of the bidder,40 which is narrower than 
“associates” found in the equivalent UK and Hong Kong provisions. As described in Part 
V(1) below, the matter was considered in the lead up to the recent 2015 changes to the 
Companies Act but the Government decided not to make the amendment.  
 
The result is that controlling shareholders in Singapore-incorporated targets are able 
to effect transaction arbitrage, that is, to circumvent the narrow requirements of the 
compulsory acquisition requirements in two ways, which would not have been possible in 
Hong Kong. First, in family-held companies, the controlling shareholder can use a bid vehicle 
whose shareholders are natural persons. In such a case, the shareholdings held by the natural 
persons and their associates can still count towards the 90% acceptance threshold under s 215 
of the Singapore Companies Act. In a recent takeover in Singapore, the press debated as to 
                                                          
38  Insofar as the main foreign companies with English origins that are listed in Singapore (namely, 
Bermuda, BVI and Cayman Islands), none of them has followed the UK Companies Act 1985 insofar as 
restricting the shareholdings of associates from counting towards the acceptance threshold for a squeeze-out or 
its equivalent. See Bermuda Companies Act, s 102; BVI Companies Act, s 176; Cayman Islands Companies 
Law, s 88.  
39  Report of the Company Legislation Framework and Regulatory Framework Committee (2002), 
Recommendation 5.7. The Committee was appointed by the Ministry of Finance, the Attorney-General’s 
Chambers and the Monetary Authority of Singapore in December 1999. The CLRFC’s terms of reference were 
“to undertake a comprehensive and coherent review of our company law and regulatory framework and 
recommend a modern company law and regulatory framework for Singapore which accords with global 
standards and which will promote a competitive economy.”  The members of the CLRFC comprised mainly 
persons who are in the private sector and with wide ranging experience and expertise. 
40  A related corporation is defined as including the holding company, subsidiary or fellow subsidiary; see 
s 6 of the Singapore Companies Act.  
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the principle on whether to exclude such holdings. 41 In Hong Kong, such holdings are 
excluded under the Hong Kong Takeover Code or the Companies Ordinance 2012 because 
they are regarded as holdings held by “concert parties” or “associates” of the bidder 
respectively. 42 
Second, in private equity driven acquisitions, the controlling shareholders can 
incorporate a special purpose bid vehicle (SPV), taking care that no individual controlling 
shareholder holds more than 50% of the SPV. The SPV and the controlling shareholders enter 
into an acquisition agreement for the latter to tender their respective shares to the SPV. The 
shareholdings of the SPV shareholders may count towards the 90% threshold under s 215 of 
the Singapore Companies Act. In Hong Kong, such holdings would also be excluded as they 
are regarded as holdings held either by “concert parties” or “associates” of the bidder.  
In theory, to mitigate the problems of prejudice to minority shareholders, section 215 
of the Singapore Companies Act allows a dissenting shareholder to object to the compulsory 
acquisition by filing an application to the Singapore court. However, dissent is extremely rare 
and there is no reported case of an application under section 215, despite the fact that 
transaction arbitrage is in fact widespread (as explained in our findings).  
2. Schemes of arrangement 
 
The UK Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 contained the predecessor to the 
current s 899(1) of the UK Companies Act 2006. Under section 899(1), to effect a scheme of 
arrangement for a bidder to control the whole of the target in a single transaction, it requires 
the approval of the majority in number, representing 75% in value of the voting shares 
                                                          
41  Cai HX, “A different spirit of the law in OSIM takeover”, Business Times (Singapore, 6 May 2016). 
42  Hong Kong Companies Ordinance 2012, s 667(1)(a)(vii).  
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present and voting, as well as sanction of the court. The threshold is thus lower than required 
for compulsory acquisition. English case law has held that bidders cannot vote alongside with 
the minority shareholders at the scheme meeting.43 Hong Kong and Singapore adopted the 
UK Companies Act’s scheme of arrangement provisions in their respective company 
legislation. However, as is the case of compulsory acquisitions, both jurisdictions have 
diverged in respect of the regulation of schemes. 
 
In Singapore, the law and regulation relating to the scheme of arrangement was 
identical to the UK except for two developments. In 2001, the Singapore Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers (Singapore Takeover Code), which applies to Singapore and foreign companies 
within a primary listing in Singapore, made it clear that bidders and their concert parties must 
abstain from voting at the same scheme meeting as the other (minority) shareholders.44 This 
requirement is arguably more restrictive than the position that exist at common law. At 
common law, if the shareholders are treated the same under the same scheme, they will vote in 
a single class. The exception occurs only if the bidder or its subsidiaries are shareholders of the 
target; in such a case, they are regarded as having sufficiently different rights to justify 
separate meetings; other concert parties of the bidder (which are not its subsidiaries) arguably 
can vote alongside with the minority shareholders. 45 In 2012, section 210 (the provision on 
schemes of arrangement) was amended to allow the court the discretion to disapply the 
majority in number requirement.  
 
                                                          
43  Re Hellenic and General Trust Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 123. 
44  Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers (3 October 2002).  
45  See Re Hellenic, fn 43 above and accompanying text. See also Re TT International [2012] 2 SLR 213; 
UDL Argos Engineering and Heavy Industries Co v Li Oi Lin [2001] 3 HKLRD 634. 
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In contrast, Hong Kong followed a different path in respect of schemes of 
arrangement, by making them much more restrictive than in the UK or Singapore. In 1993, the 
(then) rule 2.10 of the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers was introduced, which 
required approval of a majority in number representing 90% of the votes cast at the scheme 
meeting.46 Further changes were made in 199847 and in 2002.48 Under the current 
requirements, a scheme of arrangement requires the approval by 75% of votes of the 
disinterested shareholders present and voting. Additionally, the number of votes cast against 
the scheme must not exceed 10% of the votes of the all of the disinterested shareholders (also 
known as the 10% objection rule).49 It should be noted that as the 10% objection rule is 
contained in rule 2.10 of the Hong Kong Takeover Code, and applies to Hong Kong companies 
and foreign companies with primary listings in Hong Kong. For People’s Republic of China 
(PRC)-incorporated companies where it is possible to effect a squeeze-out by way of merger or 
absorption, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) applies rule 2.10 of the 
Hong Kong Takeover Code.50 In 2012, this 10% objection rule was given statutory backing 
with the Companies Ordinance 2012 for Hong Kong-incorporated companies. 51 The 10% 
objection rule replaces the requirement for there to be a majority in number of the shareholders 
voting for the scheme.52  
                                                          
46  See Securities and Futures Commission, A Consultation Paper on a Review of the Hong Kong Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers (February 1998). 
47  The change in 1998 kept the 90% approval threshold but added a further test, if the 90% approval  was 
not met, more than 2.5% must vote against the proposal for it to fail. See Securities and Futures Commission, 
Consultation Paper on a Review of the Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers (February 1998). 
48  The 2002 amendments provide that all takeovers effected by way of a scheme of arrangement must 
have the approval of 75% disinterested shareholders present and voting and no more than 10% of the 
disinterested shareholders voting against. See Securities and Futures Commission, Consultation Paper on the 
Review of the Codes of Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases (April 2001). 
49  Hong Kong Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Buybacks, rule 2.10. 
50  E.g. squeeze-out or privatisation of the “H” shares of Great Wall Technology in 2014 (copy on file 
with authors).  
51  HK Companies Ordinance 2012, ss 673-674. 
52  See Companies Registry, Briefing Notes on Part 13 – Arrangements, Amalgamation, and Compulsory 
Share Acquisition in Takeover and Share Buy-Back.  
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The 10% objection rule is a “unique” minority shareholder protection device, 53 which 
is not present in Singapore or in the UK. For example, in Singapore, if the target firm has 
40% of the shares held by the bidder and its concert parties, dissenting shareholders must 
hold at least 15% of the votes to block the vote, assuming that all shareholders turn up to 
vote. However, in Hong Kong, dissenting shareholders holding as few as 6% can block the 
vote. As such, it is easier for the minority shareholders to achieve the 10% objection 
threshold than the headcount test.  
 
3. Delisting offer 
In contrast to compulsory acquisition and schemes of arrangement whose provisions 
are found in the company legislation, the delisting process has been a function of stock 
exchange listing rules. The bidder, which is the controlling shareholder, procures the delisting 
of the company, and then proceeds to make an exit offer for the remaining shares. The exit 
offer is usually an offer to the shareholders for cash. More rarely, the company undertakes a 
selective capital reduction to cancel the shares held by the minority shareholders.54  
In this respect, Singapore and Hong Kong have diverged from the UK approach, 
which itself has recently seen significant changes to the regulation of delistings. In UK, prior 
to July 2005, an issuer could cancel its listing with the appropriate notice. In 2005,55 the 
listing rules were amended to require a bidder to achieve 75% of the target pursuant to a 
takeover offer before the bidder may cancel the target’s listing with the appropriate notice. 
                                                          
53  See Re PCCW Ltd [2009] HKCU 494. 
54  E.g. in recent years there have been capital reduction cases involving companies have been delisted: 
Keppel Land Limited (2015), Gul-Technologies Singapore Limited (2014), CK Tangs Limited (2011).  
55  The requirement of shareholder approval was put in place following the consultation paper published 
by the Financial Services Authority (as it then was) Consultation Paper 203: Review of the listing regime 
(CP203), setting out its policy proposals for consultation. See Randall, Listing and prospectus rules: a guide to 
the new regime” (2005) Practical Law for Companies 23. 
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Otherwise, a withdrawal of listing requires approval of 75% of the shareholders, present and 
voting.56 In May 2014, the listing rules57 were amended again and a bidder, which has more 
than 50% of the target and is seeking to withdraw the premium listing after its takeover offer 
of the target upon reaching 75%, must also obtain acceptances from the majority of the 
minority shareholders. 58 In a non-takeover situation, an issuer would require approval of 75% 
of the shareholders, present and voting.  Where there is a controlling shareholder, the 
delisting has to be separately approved by a majority of the votes held by the independent 
shareholders.59 
In Singapore, since 1999, the listing rules of SGX provide that voluntary delisting by 
listed companies requires approval of at least 75% of the voting shares, present and voting, 
and not more than 10% voting against the delisting.60 The directors and controlling 
shareholders may vote. 61  The rule was prompted by the takeovers of CSA Holdings by 
Computer Science Corp and of Inchcape Marketing Services by Li & Fung, where the bidder 
stated its intention to delist the target once it obtains control, even though it was not entitled 
to exercise its rights of compulsory acquisition.62 Despite the assertion of the SGX that the 
                                                          
56  Listing rules (pre-May 2014), rule 5.2.5 R.  
57  FSA Listing Rules 5.2.11D. 
58  Listing rules, rule 5.2.11A. The rules were amended to provide greater protection for minority 
shareholders in controlled companies, in light of the corporate governance scandals surrounding these 
companies, such as Bumi (now renamed Asia Mineral Resources), Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation 
(now de-listed) and Essar Energy; see R Barker and I Chiu, ‘Protecting Minority Shareholders in Blockholder-
Controlled Companies – Evaluating the UK’s Enhanced Listing Regime in Comparison with Investor Protection 
Regimes in New York and Hong Kong’ Capital Markets Law Journal 10 (2014) 98-132. The May 2014 
amendments allows the majority of the minority shareholders to be disapplied if an existing controlling 
shareholder achieves 80% shareholding of the target after a takeover offer. However, this disapplication 
exception was removed in January 2016. FSA Listing Rules 5.2.11D. The FCA found that this disapplication 
had "potentially significant consequential and unintended implications for investor protection". If an offeror 
already held 80% of the issuer's voting share capital, it had the ability to cancel the issuer's listing without either 
independent shareholder approval or its offer being accepted by any independent shareholders. 
59  Listing rules, rule 5.2.5 R. 
60  Stock Exchange of Singapore, Statement: Amendment of Listing Manual; Clause 208 – Delisting (14 
January 1999), copy on file with author.  
61  Listing Manual, rr 1307 and 1309. 
62  See also J Chia “SES gives shareholders a say in delisting plans” Straits Times (Singapore, 15 January 
1999). 
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amendment was consistent with the practices of other stock exchanges, 63 it was then 
consistent with the UK but was not consistent with Hong Kong (as outlined below). 
Singapore has not followed the restrictions for delisting that were put in place in UK in May 
2015 and January 2016. 
In Hong Kong, since 1991,64 an issuer which has a listing on the SEHK only may 
withdraw its listing if it has obtained approval of an independent majority representing at 
least 75% voting shares, present and voting; the directors, chief executives and any 
controlling shareholders or any of their associates are not allowed to vote at the meeting. The 
shareholders should be offered compensation in the form of cash or other reasonable 
alternatives. This provision requiring independent shareholder approval was introduced after 
the public outcry surrounding the 1990 delisting of Video Technology (with a view of 
relisting at another market) at a price that was widely seen as extremely low. 65 
 
In 2004, the SEHK listing rules were amended to provide a further safeguard for the 
minority shareholders along the lines of the 10% objection rule found in the Hong Kong 
Takeover Code; 66 rule 6.12 of the SEHK listing rules provides for that for the withdrawal of 
listing of an issuer, there must be approval by not less than 75% of the voting shares, present 
                                                          
63  Raj C, “SES makes voluntary delisting rules more transparent”, Business Times (Singapore, 15 January 
1999). 
64  Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, Rules Governing the Listing of Securities (3rd edition, 1989) as 
amended, rule 6.06. For companies listed on the Growth Enterprises Market (GEM), see rule 9.20 of the GEM 
rules (which is similar in the requirement).  
65  In the end, Video Technology sought a separate majority vote by independent shareholders, even 
though the stock exchange listing rules only required the approval of 75% of the shareholders, present and 
voting. See Chai CK, “Exchange to force vote on delisting” South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, 28 January 
1991); G Hewett, “Rule move will block ‘back-door delisting’”, South China Morning Post (Hong Kong, 14 
April 1991). 
 
66  SEHK, Proposed Amendments to the Listing Rules Relating to Corporate Governance Issues 
Consultation Conclusions (2003), <https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/newsconsul/mktconsul/cpbefore2005.htm> 
accessed 1 July 2016.   
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and voting, and the number of votes cast against the delisting resolution must not be more 
than 10% of all of the votes attached to disinterested shareholders.  
 
Thus, the result is that shareholders in Singapore face the pressure to tender their 
shares in ways not present in Hong Kong. Not only can the controlling shares vote in the 
delisting offer in Singapore, if the minority shareholders in Singapore do not accept the offer, 
they face the prospect of holding delisted shares. In contrast, HK Takeover Code provides 
that not only the delisting resolution must be subject the approvals set out in the listing rules, 
there is an additional requirement that the bidder is entitled to exercise, and in fact exercising, 
its rights of compulsory acquisition.67 Unless exempted, there should not be a situation where 
the shareholders are left holding delisted shares. One final point to note is that unlike the US, 
there is no equivalent of an alternative over-the-counter trading system in Singapore such as 
the Pink Sheets.68 Thus, minority shareholders who do not accept the delisting offer would 
suffer from the lack of liquidity, which might further undermine the value of their shares. 
 
IV. Do the Differences in Regulation Result in Different Outcomes? 
 
1. Data and methodology 
 
In this Part, we seek to test whether the differences in regulation lead to different 
results for minority shareholders in Hong Kong and Singapore. Our database comprises all of 
                                                          
67  Hong Kong Takeovers Code, rule 2.2(c). However, we note that the Takeovers Panel has granted an 
exemption from this requirement in the case of the delisting of the H shares of PRC companies from SEHK, due 
to the fact that there is no right of compulsory acquisition under PRC law. See e.g. Fosun International and 
Shanghai Forte Land, Composite Offer and Response Document dated 25 February 2011 (copy on file with 
authors). 
68  See eg J Macey, “Down and Out in the Stock Market: The Law and Economics of the Delisting 
Process” (2008) 51 J Law and Economics 683.  
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the general offers (which were followed by compulsory acquisitions), schemes of 
arrangement and delisting offers in Hong Kong and Singapore that were announced during 
the period of 2008-2014, including locally incorporated and foreign companies. We choose 
2008 as this was the year of the occurrence of the global financial crisis which led to a 
number of squeeze-outs in Hong Kong and Singapore.69 M&A transactions involving 
publicly listed companies in Hong Kong and Singapore are identified using the Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC) international mergers and acquisitions database. However, in the 
case of Singapore, we find that the database of M&A transactions implemented by way of 
delisting offers in the SDC database is not complete. We therefore supplement with the list of 
companies which were delisted with exit offers during the relevant period, such list having 
been obtained from SGX.  In the case of Hong Kong, we examined the list of companies that 
were delisted from SEHK Factbook70 for each year during the 2008-2014 period and we then 
check the reasons for their delistings. We are unable to find any formerly SEHK-listed 
company during the relevant period that was the subject-matter of a delisting offer and hence 
it is not necessary to supplement the data for Hong Kong. 
For each transaction, we examine the target company circulars (including scheme 
circulars) and announcements that are published by the target companies, available in the 
stock exchange filings, company websites and subscription databases.71 We have only 
included M&A transactions involving squeeze-outs by controlling shareholders, which 
including their concert parties, hold 30% or more of the target shares. The concert party 
shareholdings are determined by the disclosures in the target circulars and the disclosure 
requirements are identical in Singapore and Hong Kong, as both jurisdictions draw their 
                                                          
69   WY Wan “Independent Financial Advisers’ Opinions for Public Takeovers and Related Party 
Transactions in Singapore”, (2012) 30 C&SLJ 32.  
70  HKEX Factbook, available at https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/statrpt/factbook/factbook.htm (last 
accessed 9 January 2017). 
71  These include CapitalIQ and Perfect Filings.  
 23 
 
requirements from the UK Code. We excluded M&A transactions that did not involve the 
goal of the acquisitions of the remaining interests of the shares (such as acquisitions of only 
partial interests in the company and takeovers where the bidder has stated that it has no 
intention of compulsorily acquire the remaining shares). Our sample yields 42 and 110 
squeeze-out transactions by controlling shareholders in Hong Kong and Singapore 
respectively. (There were 62 and 123 squeeze-out transactions in aggregate in these two 
jurisdictions respectively.) 
We then hand collect information relating to the terms of the squeeze-outs, the 
transaction structures, and share ownership as at the date of announcement of the takeover. 
We also collect target firm characteristics, including total assets and market to book value as 
at the end of the financial year prior to the takeover announcement. We calculate the 
premium by taking the difference between the offer price at the date of announcement and the 
volume-weighted average prices (VWAP) of the ordinary shares of the target companies for a 
period of 12 months, 6 months, 3 months, and 1 month, in each case preceding the 
announcement of the squeeze-out, and the difference is scaled by the relevant VWAP price. 
Information on the VWAP prices on the Hong Kong and Singapore-listed companies are 
obtained either from the circulars (which extract the prices from Bloomberg) or directly from 
Bloomberg (if the prices are not stated in the circulars). We also calculate the premium to net 
asset value (NAV) (as at the most current financial information available before the takeover 
announcement), which is obtained from SDC Platinum, and missing values are manually 
supplemented with the data from Bloomberg. One of the target companies (CapitaMalls Asia) 
is dual listed on SGX and SEHK and we classified as it as a SGX-listed company as it is 
primarily listed on SGX.72 
                                                          
72  The company has a secondary listing on SEHK.  
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Our approach is comparable to the approaches conducted by Subramanian (for US 
transactions) and Bugeja (for Australian transactions) in determining whether different 
transactions lead to different outcomes for minority shareholders. In the US, Subramanian 
focused on whether the then-different standards of judicial review for tender offers versus 
merger squeeze-outs affect minority shareholder gains in squeeze-out transactions post-
Siliconix, 73 an important Delaware case that provides that a freeze-out by tender offer be not 
subject to an entireness fairness review, as compared to a merger squeeze-out.74 
Subramanian’s empirical study of controlling stockholder squeeze-out transactions in a four-
year period following the Siliconix case found that minority shareholders obtained lower 
cumulative abnormal returns in tender offer squeeze-outs relative to merger squeeze-outs in 
that period.  Bugeja found that the premium for schemes of arrangement are lower than for 
general offers in Australia, in line with the prediction that the approval thresholds for 
schemes are lower than that for general offers. Following Bugeja, we seek to test whether the 
premium is affected the transaction structures, which has been used in prior literature as a 
measure of whether target shareholders are disadvantaged in transaction structures.75 
Figure 1 summarises the squeeze-out transactions in the sample by markets and 
transaction structures (general offers followed by compulsory acquisitions, schemes of 
arrangement and delisting offers). We classify squeeze-outs of H shares of PRC-incorporated 
companies effected by merger by absorption as schemes of arrangement because they are 
                                                          
73  In re Siliconix, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 2001 WL 716787 at *17 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
74  See F. Restrepo, ‘Do Different Standards Of Judicial Review Affect The Gains Of Minority 
Shareholders In Freeze-Out Transactions? A Re-Examination Of Siliconix’, (2013) 3 Harvard Business Law 
Review 321; Guhan Subramanian, ‘Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory And Evidence’, (2007) 36 Journal of 
Legal Studies 1. 
75  See M Bugeja et al, “To scheme or bid? Choice of takeover method and impact on premium” (2015) 
Aust J of Mgt 1; Du et al, n 20s above. See also G Subramanian, “Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and 
Evidence” (2007) 36 J of Legal Studies 1. Cf TW Bates et al, “Shareholder Wealth Effects and Bid Negotiation 
in Freeze-out Deals: Are Minority Shareholders Left Out in the Cold” (2006) 81 J Fin Econ 681 (who argues 
that a comparison of prices paid in various transaction structures may be meaningless if it is not possible to 
compare prices with some reliable indication on the fair value of the shares).    
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required to comply with rule 2.10 of the Hong Kong Takeover Code. Figure 1 shows that 
squeeze-outs are much more common in Singapore than Hong Kong. Based on deal numbers, 
Singapore has almost twice the number of squeeze-outs than Hong Kong, even though the 
number and market capitalisations of listed companies in Hong Kong is significantly higher 
than in Singapore.76 Figure 2 further shows the breakdown of squeeze-outs effected by 
bidders and their concert parties who hold more than 30% of the target respectively. The 
number of cases in the two markets are consistent with our hypothesis that Singapore is more 
liberal in the squeeze-out requirements, particularly in favour of controlling shareholders. 
This results a larger number of squeeze-outs in Singapore than in Hong Kong even if we 
confine to cases where the bidder’s shareholding is higher than 30% at the commencement of 
the offer (also known as toehold).  
 
Figure 1  Number of squeeze-outs and their respective transaction structures in 
each market 
[To insert] 
 
Figure 2 Number of squeeze-outs by controlling and non-controlling shareholders 
in each market 
[To insert] 
 
 
We measure the differences in the means of premium paid in squeeze-out transactions 
between the two jurisdictions. Table 1 shows our results for Hong Kong and Singapore under 
three different transaction structures in respect of the premiums to net asset value (NAV) and 
                                                          
76  Source: World Federation of Exchanges, showing that the number of listed companies as at December 
2015 in Hong Kong and Singapore is 1,866 and  769 respectively. The market capitalisation of listed companies 
as at December 2014 in Hong Kong and Singapore is USD3,966 billion and USD774.1 billion respectively. 
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1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 12-month VWAP where data is available.77 Table 1 is 
confined to cases where squeeze-outs were effected by controlling shareholders (namely, 
shareholders and their concert parties holding 30% as at the date of announcement).  
 
 
 
Table 1 Means of premiums offered in Singapore and Hong Kong for 
squeeze-outs by controlling shareholders 
[To insert] 
 
Comparing the two jurisdictions, we find that in general premiums offered in Hong 
Kong are statistically significantly higher than in Singapore. If we compare all the cases 
between the two markets, we find that generally the means of premiums offered in Hong 
Kong are statistically significantly higher than the premiums in Singapore.78  If we further 
control the size and profitability of a company (including total assets, total earnings and 
returns on asset), in unreported results, we find that the differences in means to premiums still 
stand for premiums to 1-month and 3-month VWAP (significant at 1% level) and 6-month 
VWAP (with p value on the borderline of 0.055). The result is consistent with the outcomes 
discussed in the previous paragraph.  
2. Findings on premium, deal structures and markets 
                                                          
77 Due to lack of market data, we cannot find historical share prices for some companies to calculate one or 
more VWAPs, especially for 12-month VWAP where we need full year data. Those companies are International 
Mining Mach Holdings Ltd, Kee Shing Holdings, SCMP Group Ltd in Hong Kong and CentraLand Ltd, 
Texchem-Pack Holdings (S) Ltd, Vantage Corp Ltd, Yantai Raffles Shipyard Ltd, The Ascott Ltd, CHT 
(Holdings) Ltd, Courts (Singapore) Ltd, Nera Telecommunications Ltd and Singapore Food Industries Ltd in 
Singapore. 
 
78 We find that the differences in means between Singapore and Hong Kong is statistically significant for 
premiums to 1-month, 3-month and 6-month (significant at 1% level) and premiums to NAV and 12-month 
VWAP (significant at 5% level). 
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Figure 1 above shows that among the transaction structures involving squeeze-outs by 
controlling shareholders, Singapore has significantly more delisting offers (which is the most 
coercive form of transaction structure), while Hong Kong has more schemes of arrangement. 
In general, it is more likely that squeeze-outs are effected by way of schemes of arrangement 
in Hong Kong (nearly 50% of all cases in Hong Kong) than in Singapore. This is consistent 
with our prediction set out above on the transaction structure.  
Based on data shown in Table 1 above, we then compare the differences in premiums 
between different transaction structures within the same market. In Singapore, we find no 
statistical significance for the differences in means between general offers and schemes of 
arrangement. However, the mean VWAP premia of general offers are statistically 
significantly higher than those of delisting offers, regardless of which  VWAP we consider.79 
The result fits into our prediction that delisting offers, as the most coercive form of squeeze-
out, would result in lower premiums for other shareholders.  
In Hong Kong, we cannot make the comparison with the delisting offers as all of the 
transactions are implemented as either takeover offers or schemes of arrangement.80 
However, we find that there is no statistical difference in premium for the general offers and 
schemes of arrangement in Hong Kong. In other words, premiums for general offers and 
schemes of arrangement were in the same range and there is no proof showing which 
transaction structure would yield more benefits to minority shareholders in Hong Kong. This 
is in line with data in Singapore. 
Focusing at Singapore, there are two puzzles: first, why is it that among squeeze-out 
of companies with controlling shareholders, general offers remain much more common than 
                                                          
79 The differences in means between general offers and delisting offers are significant at 5% level for 1-month, 
3-month and 6-month VWAP and at 1% level for 12-month VWAP.  
80  There are transactions involving delisting of H-shares from the SEHK, but they were preceded by 
takeover offers.  
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schemes of arrangement? Second, why do minority shareholders receive a lower premium in 
general offers than in schemes? The approval threshold for general offers (90%) is higher 
than for schemes of arrangement (75%) and we would expect that the premium for general 
offers will be higher since the support required increases and yet the evidence is mixed.  To 
explain these differences, we hypothesise that there is significant transaction arbitrage that is 
exercised by controlling shareholders as explained in Part III(1) above, such that controlling 
shareholders are able to select transaction structures that allow their votes to be counted into 
the compulsory acquisition threshold. In addition, we hypothesise that with the transaction 
arbitrage, controlling shareholders can avoid paying a higher premium.  
To test our hypotheses, we look at the general offers in Singapore and identify which 
are the ones that are transaction arbitrage cases, based on the two incidents of arbitrage 
possibilities outlined in Part III(1) above. They are: (i) transactions where the controlling 
shareholder uses a bid vehicle whose shareholders are natural persons. In such a case, the 
shareholdings held by the natural persons and their associates can still count towards the 90% 
acceptance threshold under section 215 of the Singapore Companies Act. Such holdings are 
excluded in Hong Kong under the Hong Kong Takeover Code or the Companies Ordinance 
2012 because they are regarded as holdings held by “concert parties” or “associates” of the 
bidder respectively; and (ii) private equity driven acquisitions, where the controlling 
shareholders have incorporated a SPV; the SPV and the controlling shareholders enter into an 
acquisition agreement for the latter to tender their respective shares to the SPV. The 
shareholdings of the SPV shareholders may count towards the 90% threshold under section 
215 of the Singapore Companies Act. In Hong Kong, such holdings would also be excluded 
as they are regarded as holdings held by “concert parties” or “associates” of the bidder.  
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Table 2 presents our results. We find that almost half of the general offers (29 cases 
out of 63) in Singapore involve transaction arbitrage. By conducting a two-sample t-test, we 
find that the premiums payable to minority shareholders in transaction arbitrage cases of 
general offers are statistically lower than in non-transaction arbitrage cases in respect of 
premiums to the latest net asset value (significant at 1% level) and premiums to 6-month and 
12-month VWAP (significant at 5% level) (See Column E in Table 2).  The premiums paid in 
transaction arbitrage cases are slightly higher (for VWAP) but similar to those in delisting 
offers and the difference between them is not statistically significant (see Column H in Table 
2). By contrast, non-transaction arbitrage cases of general offers have statistically higher 
premia than delisting offers (see Column F in Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Transaction arbitrage and premiums in Singapore 
[To insert] 
 
 
However, once we compare non-transaction arbitrage general offers and schemes (see 
Column G in Table 2), there is no significant difference in any of the premiums payable. 
Thus, the fact that the approval threshold for non-transaction arbitrage general offers is 
stricter than for schemes of arrangement has not resulted in a difference in the outcomes. Our 
results may be compared with the results of Bugeja et al,81 who found that the use of schemes 
in Australia results in shareholders receiving lower offer prices, though our results do not 
support the same conclusion in our sample of Singapore squeeze-out cases. However, we 
only have a small sample size of only 11 schemes of arrangement, which may have resulted 
in the lack of significant difference.  
                                                          
81  Bugeja, “To scheme or bid? Choice of takeover method and impact on premium”, n 75 above. 
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Thus, Table 2 confirms our hypotheses that there is a significant amount of 
transaction arbitrage and that controlling shareholders in arbitrage cases pay less premium 
than the non-transaction arbitrage cases.  
 
3. Findings on related party transactions and squeeze-outs 
 
We have seen that in Hong Kong, the controlling shareholders’ expropriation of 
minority shareholders through squeeze-outs is relatively more stringently controlled and 
minority shareholders obtain relatively higher premiums for their shares in the squeeze-outs, 
as compared to Singapore. However, the picture may not be complete. Controlling 
shareholders may engage in other forms of tunnelling actions prior to the squeeze-out, such 
as significant related party transactions (RPTs) or self-dealing transactions between the listed 
companies and their controlling shareholders that favour the latter. For instance, asset 
tunnelling, such as selling (or buying of assets) at above (below) market prices, represents a 
diversion of the value from the listed company.82 In such a case, the transaction, and rational 
expectations of such future transactions, may result in listed companies experiencing 
significant negative returns and depressed share prices, respectively. The premiums offered 
by controlling shareholders then appear to be higher than what they would be if there were no 
self-dealings that amount to tunnelling.    
Thus, consistent with the existing literature, any evaluation to the regulation squeeze-
outs is not complete unless we consider potential tunnelling transactions between the listed 
                                                          
82  Eg Cheung YL, Rau PR & Stouraitis A “Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from 
connected party transactions in Hong Kong” (2006) 82 J. Finan. Econ. 343; B Black, “How corporate 
governance affect firm value? Evidence on a self-dealing channel from a natural experiment in Korea” (2015) 
51 Journal of Banking & Finance 131.   
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companies and their controlling shareholders.83 Existing literature has demonstrated that 
controlling shareholders do expropriate wealth through self-dealing transactions in Hong 
Kong.84 More particularly, in the context of squeeze-outs, in Hong Kong, Du et al have 
demonstrated that in a sample of squeeze-outs of 61 companies, the controlling shareholders 
enter into disadvantageous RPTs with the listed companies, and then proceed to squeeze out 
the minority shareholders at low prices when remaining public is no longer attractive.85  
 
The difficulty with regulating RPTs is that  RPTs are not necessarily always inimical 
to the non-controlling shareholders; 86 they can benefit the listed companies if they provide 
opportunities to the listed companies to transact at prices that will otherwise not be available 
to them. For these reasons, RPTs are required to be disclosed in accordance with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), on which the Singapore Financial Reporting Standards 
and Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards are based.87 In addition, under the respective 
jurisdiction’s stock exchange rules, transactions between the listed companies and their 
controlling shareholders (or directors), known as connected party transactions (CPTs) in 
Hong Kong 88  and interested person transactions (IPTs) in Singapore89 are regulated 
                                                          
83  Gilson & J Gordon, “Controlling Controlling Shareholders”, n 7 above. Gilson and Gordon have 
argued that, in the US context, one should also consider a third form of tunneling, that is, the rules governing the 
sales of control. However, in our paper, we have not considered the rules governing the sales of control in 
connection with tunneling as the takeover codes in both Hong Kong and Singapore require that the premium to 
be paid upon the sale of control to be shared with all of the minority shareholders pursuant to the mandatory bid 
rule, which is not present in the US. 
84  Cheung et al, ibid. In this case, the authors found expropriation of minority shareholders through 
connected party transactions (explained below). 
85  Du J, He Q & Yuen SW (2013) “Tunneling and the decision to go private: Evidence from Hong Kong” 
22 Pacific Basin Finan J. 50. 
86  See R Gilson & J Gordon, “Controlling Controlling Shareholders”, n 7 above; Atanasov V, Black B 
and Ciccotello C, “Law and Tunneling” (2012) 37 Journal of Corporation Law 1. 
87  Source: IFRS Foundation, IFRS Application Around the World: Jurisdiction Profile for Hong Kong 
and Singapore, <http://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/pages/jurisdiction-profiles.aspx> accessed 1 July 
2016. 
 
88  SEHK listing rules, ch 14A. 
89  SGX listing rules, ch 9.  
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specifically.90 CPTs and IPTs requires full disclosures to the relevant stock market and/or 
independent shareholder approvals, depending on the relevant thresholds of the transactions 
relative to the size of the listed companies. 
 
We seek to test whether in each jurisdiction, squeeze-outs by controlling shareholders 
are preceded with significantly higher RPTs (or the associated CPTs and IPTs) as compared 
to squeeze-outs by non-controlling shareholders. If so, it will suggest that there is a likelihood 
of expropriation by controlling shareholders, in addition to that suggested by the evidence 
relating to the premiums payable in squeeze-out transactions. Using a two-sample t-test on 
our sample of Hong Kong squeeze-out transactions, we find that the mean amount of RPTs in 
the fiscal year preceding the squeeze-out transactions by controlling shareholders are 
(US$241.6 million), which is statistically significantly higher than the mean amount of 
corresponding RPTs for squeeze-out transactions by non-controlling shareholders 
(US$112.44 million) (significant at 5% level). We obtain the same results after controlling 
for the size of the companies (total assets and earnings). When we test the differences in the 
mean amount of CPTs in the fiscal year preceding the squeeze-outs transactions by 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders, we obtain similar results (CPTs being 
US$141.90 million and US$47.26 respectively, and the difference being significant at 5% 
level). Similar results are obtained after we put in controls for the size of the companies. In 
Singapore, by contrast, we do not find statistical significance in respect of the difference 
between the mean amount of RPTs (or IPTs) in the fiscal year prior to squeeze-outs by 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders, with or without controls for the size of the 
companies.  
                                                          
90  The definitions of “connected parties” and “interested persons” are not the same as “related parties” 
under the accounting rules of Hong Kong and Singapore respectively. 
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Thus, the evidence suggests that while the law and regulation more stringently polices 
squeeze-outs by minority shareholders in Hong Kong, there is a distinct possibility that 
controlling shareholders may nevertheless potentially engage in other forms of asset 
tunnelling prior to the squeeze-out, thereby incurring value losses to minority shareholders. 
The risk of asset tunnelling appears to be higher in Hong Kong than in Singapore. Unlike 
squeeze-outs, it is often much more difficult for the minority shareholders to assess RPTs, 
since they involve an assessment of whether the value that the listed company is giving is at 
least equal to the value that it receives. Thus, any reform to the squeeze-out regime should be 
made in conjunction with the evaluation of the expropriation of benefits via RPTs (and their 
associated CPTs and IPTs).  
 
 
V. Reasons for the Differences in the Regulation 
 
Having demonstrated the differences in the substantive outcomes for minority 
shareholders in squeeze-out transactions in Hong Kong and Singapore, we turn to the 
question of why they are different. In this Part, we argue that the differences are accounted 
due to a combination of reasons – differences in share ownership by adult population and the 
influence of the press, as well as the mode of regulation, which have deeper, substantive 
consequences. 
 
1. Differences in share ownership and influence of the press 
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Why have the regulators have made it a priority to ensure protection of the minority 
investors in Hong Kong, more so that in Singapore? We suggest that it is because of the higher 
local retail participation in the stock market, and the fact that the regulator wanted to correct 
particularly egregious behaviour of controlling shareholders that occurred in response to media 
reports, in Hong Kong. Unlike other kinds of expropriating behaviour such as RPTs, CPTs 
(Hong Kong) and IPTs (Singapore) where the exact private benefits of control are not disclosed 
and tunneling is much more difficult to measure, unfair squeeze-outs are more visible as there 
are existing benchmarks which shareholders can use, including premiums to historical share 
prices, profitability and asset values. 
   
We argue that the SFC took a more pro-minority investor protection attitude, 
particularly in 1990s due to the aggressive documented squeeze-outs of family controlled 
companies that were reported widely by the media. This could be seen from the Video-Tech 
squeeze-out in 1990, where in the aftermath, market participants actively lobbied the SEHK 
which introduced the requirement that controlling shareholders were barred from voting in 
back-door delistings. In 1992, in connection with the consultation for giving minority 
shareholders a greater say in whether squeeze-outs effected by schemes of arrangement were 
successful, the SFC pointed to the risks that Hong Kong investors face due to the closely held 
nature of Hong Kong companies (which at that time was the predominance of family 
controlled companies), the limited development of independent directors, and the lack of an 
activist institutional base. Similar concerns arose in 1998 in connection with determining the 
appropriate threshold for schemes of arrangement.  
In contrast, the squeeze-outs and delistings in the 1990s in Singapore tended to be 
situations involving external bidders willing to take the companies private by offering decent 
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premiums.91 Squeeze-outs at opportunistic prices became controversial in Singapore only 
during post-dot com bubble in 2001, in the wake of the SARS epidemic in 2003 and 
particularly the global financial crisis of 2008. While independent law reform committees in 
Singapore did recommend the law and regulation to be more consistent with the UK and 
Hong Kong, the Government has been reluctant to make it too difficult for blockholders of 
family companies to privatise or restructure the operations. The Singapore regulators were 
also concerned not to put in place policies that discourage companies (and their controlling 
shareholders) from listing in Singapore.  
Unlike Hong Kong, while the media in Singapore may report on the general 
dissatisfaction of the minority shareholders in the squeeze-out, the impact is somewhat 
lessened since the local retail participation in the stock market has historically been lower in 
Singapore than in Hong Kong.92 Since 1990, 9.2% of the adult population has become 
invested in the Hong Kong stock market and this figure rose to 21.5% and 36.2% in 2000 and 
2014 respectively. While we are unable to obtain comparable figures for Singapore for the 
1990s, but by 2009, only 11.1% of the adult population are stock investors in Singapore, 
compared to 22.98% in Hong Kong.93 In 2014, SGX has also separately reported that only 8 
                                                          
91  Sivanithy R, “Latest Hollowing-out is Different and Troubling” Business Times (Singapore, 13 May 
2016).  
 
92  Eg SGX, ‘SGX Says More Retail Investors in Stock Market; Launches 2014 Edition of StockWhiz 
Contest’ (30 June 2014) <http://www.btinvest.com.sg/markets/news/88567.html?source=si_news> accessed 17 
March 2016; see also L Kan, “SGX proposals widen access to IPOs for retail investors”, Business Times 
(Singapore, 1 October 2012), citing SGX data that the local retail participation in Singapore is at 8%, in contrast 
to Hong Kong which is at 25%. 
93  See Grout et al, “One Half-Billion Shareholders and Counting: Determinants of Individual Share 
Ownership around the World” (2009), SSRN, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1364765> 
accessed 1 June 2016. 
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to 10% of the whole population in Singapore was invested in stocks, compared to 25% in 
Hong Kong.94   
Given the lower retail participation in the stock market, it is likely that media reports 
on unfair squeeze-outs have less influence on the regulators. For instance, Miller found that 
in the US market, the press covers firms and accounting frauds that are of interest to a broad 
set of readers;95 thus, greater local participation is likely to result in press reporting of 
egregious behaviour or fraud. In under-developed markets, such as in Russia, Dyck found 
that the shareholders’ influence and lobbying the international media increases the likelihood 
that the corporate governance violation is reversed or the fact that the regulator is forced to 
act.96 
 
2. Mode of regulation – legislation and soft law 
 
In both Hong Kong and Singapore, the regulation of squeeze-out is not found only in 
respective company legislation but also in stock exchange listing rules and the takeover 
codes.97 However, the principal drivers of the mode of regulation, that is, the regulators, are 
different in the two jurisdictions. In Hong Kong, the main driver of tightening of the squeeze-
out rules has been the SFC and the SEHK, which oversee the amendments in the Hong Kong 
Takeover Code and the SEHK listing rules respectively.98 Half of the board of Hong Kong 
                                                          
94  See R Sivanithy, “CDP sees highest 12-month surge in new accounts” Business Times (Singapore, 20 
June 2014). 
 
95  Miller, G., “The press as watchdog for accounting fraud” (2006) 44 Journal of Accounting Research, 
1001–1033. 
96  Dyck, A., Volchkova, N., Zingales, L., “The corporate governance role of the media: Evidence from 
Russia” (2008) 63 Journal of Finance, 1093–1135. 
 
97  The term “soft regulation” is derived from DK Smith, “Governing the Corporation: The Role of Soft-
Regulation” (2012) 35 UNSW 378. 
98  Securities and Futures Ordinance, s 23.  
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Exchanges and Clearing Limited, the parent company of SEHK, comprises of the 
Government nominees, excluding the chief executive.99 It is only in more recent years (in 
2012) that statutory backing is given to the disinterested shareholder approval in the company 
legislation. In contrast, in Singapore, the Securities Industry Council (SIC), which 
administers the Singapore Takeover Code, and the SGX have not actively initiated the 
reforms, preferring to leave any reforms to legislation.  
We give two examples. First, in respect of compulsory acquisition, as outlined in Part 
III(1)(a) above, in Hong Kong, since 2002, there was a requirement in the Hong Kong 
Takeover Code that shares held by concert parties cannot be computed into the 90% 
threshold. It was only in 2012, after a period of 10 years, that the Companies Ordinance 2012 
gave statutory effect by imposing the requirement to mandatorily exclude the computation 
from the threshold shares held by associates. In the case of Singapore, in spite of market 
feedback asking for more rigorous protection towards minority shareholders in squeeze-out, 
SGX has publicly stated that compulsory acquisition matters are matters for the legislation to 
determine.100 While two attempts were made by independent law reform committees to 
recommend that Singapore should adopt the UK’s more minority-shareholder friendly 
provisions, they have not succeeded.  
Second, for schemes of arrangement, in Hong Kong, the 10% objection rule found in 
section 674(2) of the Companies Ordinance 2012 first originates in a slightly different form 
from the amendment in of the Hong Kong Takeover Code in 1993. It has since been given 
statutory backing in the form of the Companies Ordinance 2012.101 In contrast, in Singapore, 
                                                          
99  Securities and Futures Ordinance, s 77.  
100  A Khalid, “To delist or not? It’s up to shareholders, says SGX”, Straits Times (Singapore, 1 October 
2002).  
 
101  Companies Ordinance 2012, s 674(2). 
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prior to 1999, the SIC had viewed the issue that it was a matter for the shareholders to decide 
and for the court to approve. It was only in 1999 that the SIC put in place the requirement for 
bidder and concert parties to abstain from voting, 102 which is a more modest proposal than 
Hong Kong’s  10% objection rule.  
We argue that the principal driver of regulation has substantive implications on the 
content of regulation. Legislation has to be determinate and predictable, to ensure appropriate 
enforcement, whether civil or criminal, and avoiding the need for ex post litigation. One of 
the main reasons why the Singapore Government eventually rejected the amendment to 
section 215 for the shareholdings of the associates to be excluded from the 90% threshold is 
that it would lead to indeterminacy in the law. The concept of disinterested shares would have 
also met the same objection. In contrast, if the rules are found in stock exchange listing rules 
or takeover code, notwithstanding that they also are promulgated indirectly by the state, these 
rules can afford to be more indeterminate and open-textured. Breach of the listing rules 
remains a breach of contractual obligations, though the exchange is now able to take 
disciplinary sanctions.103 Breach of the takeover code is not violation of law though the 
market participants may be subject to sanctions. It is possible for the transaction planners to 
ex ante, to obtain guidance from the securities regulators in ways which are not possible in 
legislation. Regulators are also more cautious in advocating changes to the legislation.  
VI.  Lessons and Implications 
                                                          
102  SIC, Consultation on the Revision to the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers (1 November 
1999).  
103  SGX listing rules, ch 14. 
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One general lesson from the economics and finance literature is that robust financial 
markets contribute to fast economic growth.104  In particular, as compared to the bank-
centered financial systems, economies organised around securities markets tend to promote 
innovation, hence a sustainable growth.105  At the same time, strong investor protection is 
considered crucial to viable financial markets.106  In this sense, protecting outside investors 
from exploitation by corporate insiders advances economic efficiency as a whole.  
To the extent that squeeze-outs by controlling shareholders present opportunities for 
insiders to exploit outsiders, therefore, a tight legal restraint on this particular type of activity 
contributes to uplifting investors’ confidence in the capital market, as well as the viability of 
the market.  Moreover, the higher threshold set for squeeze-outs in Hong Kong brings 
squeeze-outs deals closer to voluntary transactions between ordinary market participants.  
Barring the concern over holdouts, such voluntary transactions would create an optimal level 
of squeeze-out activities.  In other words, squeeze-outs will happen only when it does 
generate greater corporate value than leaving equity with minority shareholders.  The 
premium paid to the minority simply reflects their share of the additional corporate value 
brought about by the squeeze-out.  Consequently, should squeeze-out be the only form of 
insider exploitation, we perhaps have a good reason to sing praise for the legal approach 
taken in Hong Kong to regulate squeeze-out activities.  
Indeed, our study does show that minority shareholders of Singapore companies are in 
fact disadvantaged in compulsory acquisitions and delistings, as compared to the schemes of 
arrangement. Controlling shareholders are able to exercise transaction arbitrage around the 
                                                          
104  Robert G. King and Ross Levin, “Finance and Growth: Shumpeter Might Be Right” (1993) 108 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 717-737; Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, “Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic 
Growth” (1998) 88 American Economic Review, 537-558. 
105  John C. Coffee, Jr., Hillary A. Sale, and M. Todd Henderson, Securities Regulation: Cases and 
Materials (13th ed.) (2015) Foundation Press, 10. 
106  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “Law and Finance” (1998) 106 
Journal of Political Economy, 1113-1155. 
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minority shareholder protection provisions found in general offers and pay a lower premium. 
They have also exercised their ability to procure the delisting of the target, thereby pressuring 
the minority shareholders to accept their undervalued offers. These are areas of concern as 
controlling shareholders generally pick the transaction structures that lead to the maximum 
certainty and the lowest price. 
We also find that the existing safeguard for delistings in Singapore, that is, the 
requirement to provide a reasonable exit offer, is weak.107 The independent financial adviser 
opines on the reasonableness of the exit offer (and the independent directors normally follow 
the IFA’s advice). However, due to the inherent subjectivity of these opinions, shareholders 
cannot rely on the IFAs to deter opportunistic bids. In unreported results, we find that in 5 
(10.87%) cases in the sample of SGX-listed companies that are the subject-matter of delisting 
offers, the IFAs have found that the exit offers are fair and reasonable notwithstanding that 
the exit offers in question is at a steep discount (more than 30%) to the latest NAV as at the 
latest financial date. Only in two cases did the bidders withdraw their exit offers because the 
IFAs opined that their offers were not fair and reasonable.108  
Particularly, since retail investors usually hold smaller percentages of equity and have 
weaker bargaining positions than institutional investors, and given the goal of SGX to 
increase retail participation in the stock markets,109 there is a need to boost the confidence of 
the retail investors that they will not be short-changed by the controlling shareholders if they 
(the controllers of these companies) choose to delist.  
                                                          
107  See Wan Wai Yee, ““Independent Financial Advisers’ Opinions for Public Takeovers and Related 
Party Transactions in Singapore”, n 69 above.  
108  See Texchem Pack Holdings, “Proposed Voluntary Delisting of Texchem Pack Holdings (S) Ltd” (1 
June 2010); Elec & Eltek and Kingboard Chemical Holdings, “Proposed Voluntary Delisting of Elec & Eltek” 
(21 August 2009).  
109  See n 92 and accompanying text above. 
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In making a recommendation, however, we are also mindful that squeeze-out is not 
the sole channel through which insiders could exploit external investors.  Thus, if the rules 
are tightened against squeeze-out, it does not necessarily mean that shareholders will always 
be better off, since the controlling shareholders may substitute it for other means of 
tunnelling, namely, RPTs (or the associated CPTs and IPTs). In this regard, further 
consideration also should be placed on the scope and ambit of the listing rules relating to the 
CPTs and IPTs.110  
Finally, it is worth noting that the risk of exploitation may be especially serious when 
controlling shareholders are seeking to squeeze out the minority shareholders.  When it 
comes to the taking private deals launched by external bidders after completion of a takeover 
offer, this kind of risk might become less of a concern. In this regard, the UK approach for 
premium listed companies has the merits of clearly drawing such distinction and represents a 
middle ground between Hong Kong and Singapore positions. To recap, in the UK, a bidder 
which achieves a 75% shareholding of the target pursuant to a takeover offer can then effect a 
cancellation of listing with the appropriate notice. However, the bidder which has more than 
50% of the target and is seeking to withdraw the premium listing after its takeover offer of 
the target upon reaching 75%, must also obtain acceptances from the majority of the minority 
shareholders on the date that its firm intention to make its takeover offer was announced.111 
These delisting rules found in the UK for the premium listed companies are generally more 
favourable to minority shareholders where it is the controlling shareholders taking the 
company private. The lack of response on the part of passive or untraceable shareholders will 
work against the bidder. If adopted in Singapore in place its current delisting requirements, 
this will represent an improvement to the position of the minority shareholders where the 
                                                          
110  See nn 88-89 above.  
111  FCA Listing Rules, r. 5.2.11A. See nn 58-59 and accompanying text. 
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current threshold for approval of the delisting proposal is 75%, with not more than 10% 
voting against, of shareholders present and voting. In such a case, the lack of response on the 
part of passive or untraceable shareholders will work in favour of the bidder. In contrast, the 
current Hong Kong rules make it very difficult for there to be a delisting since it requires 
75% vote of disinterested shareholders, and does not draw a distinction between the cases of 
whether the delisting has occurred after a takeover by controlling or non-controlling 
shareholders.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
In both the Hong Kong and Singapore systems, each of which features concentrated 
share ownership and whose company law heritage is found in the UK, there are important 
differences in regulating squeeze-outs. Hong Kong is much more restrictive of squeeze-out 
than Singapore, particularly from the perspective of controlling shareholders. We have found 
that squeeze-outs are much more common in Singapore than Hong Kong, even after 
controlling the number of listed companies in both jurisdictions. The premium offered by 
bidders is significantly higher in Hong Kong than in Singapore, even controlling for target 
company characteristics. The choice of squeeze-out structure differs; Singapore is more likely 
to have delisting offers (which is the most coercive form of transaction structure) while Hong 
Kong is more likely to have schemes of arrangement or general offers. We also find that 
controlling shareholders exercise transaction arbitrage around the seemingly narrower rules 
of general offers in Singapore, with substantive effects on the premium received by minority 
shareholders.  
However, we note that the position relating to squeeze-outs must be evaluated in light 
of other forms of tunnelling that controlling shareholders may engage in. We find that, in 
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Hong Kong, the levels of RPTs among squeeze-outs by controlling shareholders to be higher 
than squeeze-outs by non-controlling shareholders, which suggest that controlling 
shareholders may engage in other forms of expropriation of value from minority 
shareholders.  
We argue that the reason for the differences in the regulation lies in the fact that the 
combination of the higher participation of the adult local population in the securities market, 
the greater involvement in the press and the greater depth of the securities market have 
influenced the regulators to adopt certain policies that optically favour the minority 
shareholders in Hong Kong, as compared to Singapore. Squeeze-out is one instance of such 
policy where it is immediately obvious as to the premium that is made available to the 
minority shareholders. In addition, we argue that mode of regulation is different in the two 
jurisdictions. Singapore has regarded the issue to be dealt with via legislation, rather than 
through listing rules and takeover codes, with the result that reforms which appear to 
introduce indeterminacy in the law are rejected. The concern appears that if legislation is too 
vague and flexible, too much of the discretionary power would be delegated to regulators.  
The implications of this research for Hong Kong and Singapore policies are twofold. 
First, we believe there is a case for strengthening minority shareholder protection for delisting 
offers Singapore. Second, any strengthening of minority shareholder protection in squeeze-
outs will have to be viewed in light of other forms of tunnelling that may be carried out by 
controlling shareholders. Our findings are likely to be of interest to regulators in any future 
review of the law and regulation governing Hong Kong and Singapore takeovers. It would 
also be relevant for emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere in the world as to the 
appropriate framework to be put in place to ensure the appropriate balance be struck between 
majority and minority shareholders.  
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Figure 1  Number of squeeze-out transactions and their respective transaction 
structures in each market 
 
 
Figure 2 Number of squeeze-out transactions by controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders in each market 
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Table 1 Means of premiums offered in Singapore and Hong Kong for 
squeeze-outs by controlling shareholders 
 Singapore Hong Kong 
 
General 
offer 
Scheme of 
arrangeme
nt 
Delisting Total 
General 
offer 
Scheme of 
arrangemen
t 
Total 
Total No of cases 54 11 45 110 18 24 42 
NAV 63.351 24.008 44.851 51.849 104.217 147.914 129.187 
1-month VWAP 39.064 38.691 26.145 33.954 45.065 62.222 55.623 
3-month VWAP 40.385 38.648 27.799 35.197 45.151 65.775 57.843 
6-month VWAP 42.993 37.394 28.932 36.694 50.879 60.491 56.794 
12-month VWAP 43.685 36.258 24.278 35.347 46.644 50.030 48.728 
 
Table 2 Transaction arbitrage and premiums in Singapore 
 
 
 A B C D E F G H 
 
Premiums 
to: 
Non-
arbitrage 
general 
offers 
(N=28) 
Arbitrage 
general 
offers 
(N=26) 
Delisting 
(N=45) 
Scheme of 
arrangeme
nt (N=11) 
Differences 
between A 
and B 
Differen
ces 
between 
A and C 
 
Difference
s between 
A and D 
Differenc
es 
between 
B and C 
NAV 120.035 2.308 44.851 24.008 117.727^ 75.184* 96.027 -42.543 
1 month 
VWAP 
45.256 32.396 26.145 38.691 12.860 19.111^ 6.564 6.251 
3-month 
VWAP 
45.604 34.765 27.799 38.648 10.839 17.805^ 6.957 6.965 
6-month 
VWAP 
50.729 34.961 28.932 37.394 15.768* 21.797^ 13.335 6.029 
12-month 
VWAP 
53.890 33.480 24.278 36.258 20.410* 29.612^ 17.633 9.202 
 
Notes: 
* signifies p < 0.05. 
^ signifies p < 0.01. 
 
